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The Philippines’ economic situation in Asia has always
been unique. Prior to the regional financial crisis in
the late 1990s, the country had been the odd man
out, constantly labelled as ‘the sick man of Asia’, with
output never really growing as fast as that of its
neighbours. During the crisis, it was again the East
Asian exception, albeit in a more positive sense. The
country suffered only a mild recession in 1997–8 and,
primarily because previous capital inflows had not
been very large in previous years, the country was
relatively unscathed.
Ten years after the region-wide crisis, Asian
economies – particularly the so-called economic
tigers – are again moving into a position of strength.
Their export levels have steadily risen, leading to
strong output growth and trade surpluses.
Consequently, and as part of a broad strategy to
maintain competitiveness, they have accumulated
substantial foreign exchange reserves and achieved
robust savings rates.
The Philippines, meanwhile, assumes its familiar place
as an outlier of the group. Economic growth, while
respectable, has not been fast or vigorous enough
for the country to play catch-up with the rest of East
Asia. Up until recently, domestic banks had been
saddled with non-performing loans, preventing
credit growth from stimulating the economy.
Foreign reserves, seen as ‘self-insurance’ against
another crisis, have not been as large as in other
countries in the region (although in some ways, this
may not be much of a disadvantage), while debt
levels remain consistently higher than those of its
neighbours as a proportion of national income.
(Another outlier in this sense is Indonesia.)
Yet financial fragility, the main concern of other
crisis-afflicted Asian economies, is not the country’s
largest worry. Instead, the dilemma of economic
leaders a decade after the regional downturn is – as
it has always been – how to effectively leverage for
long-term growth.
In this article, we describe how, despite the numerous
changes that have taken place, especially in the financial
sector, the story for the Philippine economy ten years
after the crisis remains largely a story of the past. While
the Philippines shares a number of economic
vulnerabilities with other Asian nations, especially in the
light of shared experiences and external conditions (e.g.
dealing with global capital), its problems are unique and
mostly concern issues related to governance and
political legitimacy, weak institutions and structural
limitations that hinder long-term prosperity.
The uniqueness of the country’s situation and the
inability of its leaders to sustain reforms has hindered
the economy from progressing as rapidly as, say, even
emerging economy Vietnam, the current darling of
foreign investors and fast becoming an Asian success
story. Its poor historical record for economic
performance has led the international financial
community to be largely intolerant of its financial
and economic problems. Weak access to external
credit and a seemingly unforgiving sentiment among
international ratings agencies and investors have
been partly responsible for preventing the country
from recovering as well and as quickly as have other
economies in the region.
Signs of life have lately breathed into the domestic
economy with reported improvements in foreign
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investor outlook, but this is re-introducing the same
set of problems the country had experienced a
decade ago, which only delineates its old dilemmas
in terms of monetary management. The stock
market, for instance, is booming, direct investments
are rising, the real estate sector has gradually
recovered, and despite signs of demand growth and
recent oil price shocks, inflation rates remain at safe
levels. Once again, the signs of prosperity brought
about by a new surge of capital inflows may simply
be masking an impending collapse if economic
fundamentals are not fully in place and excesses in
spending show up as financial imbalances. As we
have learned in the last crisis, this can have dire
consequences for the entire region.
In the next section, we provide a brief background of
the Philippines before the onset of the Asian
financial crisis and the short period that followed to
show the extent to which the country was affected
by the regional downturn and to highlight the
distinctiveness of the country’s economic situation
vis-à-vis the other affected economies in Asia. We
then outline the domestic economy’s strengths and
vulnerabilities a decade later and focus on the special
features of the country that may make it vulnerable
to external shocks. Finally, we discuss the impending
capital boom and the dilemmas for monetary policy.
The article concludes by outlining the reforms that
we believe can lessen the country’s economic and
financial vulnerabilities and help it achieve what
could have been possible more than a decade ago –
rapid East Asian growth.
1 Before and during the crisis – an East Asian
exception
In the few years prior to the Asian financial crisis,
economic leaders pursued the Philippines’ goal to
join the high growth club of East Asian economies.
This ambition had been partly fuelled by memories of
a time when domestic economic performance was
still at par with that of other economies in the
region. The country, for instance, had one of the
highest per capita incomes in the immediate post-
war era, ranking fifth in the entire set of Asian
economies and above countries such as Taiwan and
South Korea.
While the Philippines’ economic performance did
not deviate substantially from its neighbours in the
1960s and 1970s, a wide chasm developed in the
1980s, now known as the ‘lost decade’. In 1984 and
1985, the country experienced its worst crisis, with
negative real growth rates for the first time in its
post-war history, from the political and economic
turmoil that ensued after the assassination of
Benigno Aquino. The country was bypassed by the
Japanese wave that engulfed countries in Asia
following the revaluation of the yen. Domestic
output growth then averaged less than 2 per cent in
contrast to the East Asian average of more than
6 per cent.1 Observers attribute the poor growth to
a combination of several factors – these ranged from
unfavourable policy and endowment conditions, to
institutional barriers to good policy, to a string of bad
luck and bad politics (Balisacan and Hill 2003;
De Dios and Hutchcroft 2003).
Because of economic reforms implemented in the
late 1980s and early 1990s after the fall of the
Marcos dictatorship, things began to visibly improve
by the mid-1990s when the country experienced
markedly better economic performance. It was also
in this period that the Philippines again became an
East Asian exception.
Among the major South-East Asian economies, the
Philippines was arguably the least affected by the
regional financial and currency crisis that struck in
1997. Unlike its neighbours, it did not undergo a
major recession, with output contraction in 1998,
partly due to a severe drought that brought down
agricultural production.
Most notably, the country’s banking system emerged
from the crisis virtually intact. The ratio of non-
performing loans of banks, for example, was less
than 5 per cent in 1997 compared with a ratio of
over 15 per cent in other crisis countries.
The resilience in part owes to the stronger
prudential framework that the Philippine central
bank had implemented beginning in 1996, which
resulted in stronger bank capitalisation (Saldana
1999). By March 1998, for instance, capitalisation of
the commercial banking sector was a hefty 17.3 per
cent, high even by regional standards.
However, the financial system’s insulation from the
crisis also owes to the low level of financial
intermediation (e.g. loans-to-GDP ratio of less than
65 per cent) and the fact that capital inflows arrived
later and in smaller amounts than in other Asian
countries (Gochoco-Bautista and Canlas 2003).
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The Philippines declared a moratorium on principal
payments on its foreign debt following the Aquino
assassination and was effectively excluded from foreign
debt markets until 1992, when the capital account was
liberalised. Even then, international investors remained
wary about conducting their business in the country.
While the nation’s woes during the mid-1990s were
not primarily due to financial flows, of which there
were relatively little, it is often noted that the
Philippines might in time have suffered the same
weakening of the financial sector had the regional crisis
not interrupted the surge of capital to the country.
Clearly, some momentum was then already being
gained when net capital and financial flows in the
balance of payments grew from US$3.4 billion in
1995 to US$11.1 billion in 1996, or roughly 12.8 per
cent of GNP. Portfolio inflows, which included
financial derivative transactions, experienced an
unusual surge in that single year, from US$248 million
to US$2.2 billion. Medium- and long-term loans and
short-term capital also all grew substantially.
There was also a significant decline in commercial
banks’ net foreign assets, reflected as a
US$4.2 billion inflow in the country’s financial
account in 1996, indicating a growing amount of
funds being sourced abroad then re-lent or invested
locally. External borrowing by private banks had
grown from US$533 million in 1993 to US$4.5 billion
in 1996, while foreign borrowing by non-banks,
mainly private corporations with access to
international capital markets, had expanded from
US$5.2 billion to US$8.4 billion during the period.
Symptoms of unsustainable monetary policies were
visible, though not to the extent detectable in other
affected economies. The Philippines had emulated its
neighbours by running a quasi-fixed exchange rate
while maintaining an independent monetary target.
This resulted in an untenable situation as predicted by
the Mundell-Fleming framework, where capital
inflows led to an expansion of money, which then
needed to be sterilised, precipitating higher interest
rates and attracting even further inflows, in turn
fueling currency appreciation and repeating the cycle.2
Banks and corporations also over-borrowed to take
advantage of lower interest rates abroad and a
virtually fixed nominal exchange rate, and failed to
suitably hedge against currency risk. Hot money
entered the country as investors took advantage of
interest rate differentials and then speculated on
peso depreciation, increasingly through novel
financial instruments such as certain types of
derivatives transacted through universal banks
(specifically those with foreign affiliations), when a
fall in the domestic currency became more likely
because of contagion and herding effects.
Although the Philippines shared many of the economic
conditions of crisis-afflicted Asian countries, it also
dealt with its own set of problems – i.e. large real
currency appreciation (the largest among the affected
economies), chronic trade imbalances, high public debt
and historically low growth and high inflation. With the
devaluation of the baht, there was widespread
speculation on the peso, largely because the country
was seen to further lose competitiveness against its
East Asian rivals (see, for instance, Intal 2005).3
The Philippines managed to achieve 5.2 per cent
growth and export expansion of 23 per cent in 1997,
but economic conditions deteriorated due to a
severely depreciated peso coupled by liquidity
tightening and resultant high interest rates.4 Output
contracted in 1998, and the worsening environment
adversely affected the financial sector.
Bank profitability plunged in 1998, with return on
equity falling from 16.3 per cent in 1996 to 6.6 per
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Figure 1 Nominal exchange rate – levels and
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cent in 1998. The proportion of banks’ non-
performing loans (NPLs) to total loans meanwhile
rose from 2.8 per cent to 10.37 per cent. This severely
hampered the ability of monetary policy to stimulate
growth, as banks burdened by bad loans became risk
averse and reluctant to lend at a time when business
activity was slack due to low demand and excess
capacity in the economy.
While most of the other Asian economies started to
recover at the beginning 1999–2000 because of
rising global demand for their electronic products and
domestic fiscal pump-priming efforts, the Philippines’
growth continued to be restrained. Lack of stability in
political institutions and leadership, which created
uncertainty, played a role in dampening economic
activity.
Heightened dissatisfaction with the administration of
President Joseph Estrada beginning mid-2000
eventually led to its collapse in the early part of
2001, which unhappily coincided with the bursting of
the US technology bubble that nipped Asia’s
recovery. Growth during these years of political crisis
and a US slowdown averaged well below 4 per cent.
2 Ten years after – economic strengths and
vulnerabilities
Asian economies have bounced back in recent years,
with Asian governments for the most part
succeeding in putting their economic houses in order.
The Philippines has similarly improved overall – not
only in terms of building stronger resistance to
speculative attacks, but also through better economic
fundamentals and greater financial strength.5
Studies have chronicled higher exchange rate
flexibility in the region after the crisis, and basic
measures clearly show this to be true for the
Philippine currency. There has generally been greater
monthly movement in the peso as well as larger
annual changes in its value in the period after the
regional crisis (Figure 1, Table 1).
The Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP) apparently
loosened its hold on the domestic currency (e.g.
allowed the peso to depreciate during the political
crisis of the Estrada government), with nominal
exchange rate volatility generally higher and foreign
reserve volatility generally lower than their pre-crisis
levels. In this sense, the country has been less
vulnerable to a speculative attack.6
Lately, monetary authorities have again tended to
worry about the effects on the exchange rate of
large capital surges, an inclination reflected by sharp
increases in the level and variability of foreign
reserves. This may be a danger signal of the return of
a potentially unsustainable policy mix. What is
apparent is that significant real appreciation hurts
the competitiveness of the country’s exports and
makes necessary measures to cope with very large
capital flows.
The country has also been able to accumulate
international reserves above levels conventionally
considered to be safe. Its import cover, which
measures the number of months of average
payments for goods, services and income that can be
adequately covered by reserves, has grown from only
3.2 months in 1996 to 4.5 months a decade later. The
benchmark level is about three months.
The country can now fund more than twice the
amount of its short-term foreign obligations in a
year – the rule-of-thumb measure is about one-to-
one – or by about 235 per cent in 2006. Similarly,
foreign reserves can now easily finance the
Philippines’ debt-service burden, which comprises
the amount it must immediately pay to its creditors,
as the reserves-to-debt service ratio has reached
291 per cent.
The proportion of broad money backed by reserves
has lately been of interest to multilateral observers
given the experience in the recent crisis when
afflicted economies in East Asia suffered outflows of
about 18–28 per cent of M2 (ADB 2006).7 The
Philippines’ international reserves currently surpass
that amount and can cover about a third of the
country’s money supply.
The country’s ‘foreign reserve fortress’, currently at
US$23 billion, has not been as high as that of other
East Asian economies and numbers among the
lowest in the region. Even so, monetary authorities
seem to think that this level of reserves is high
enough to discourage speculation and withstand
capital flight. This situation can also be a plus in
some ways, as a large stock of reserves entails
opportunity costs and puts pressure on the central
bank to innovate from traditional reserve
management (e.g. by investing in riskier assets with
higher return or in high-risk domestic investment
ventures).
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2.1 Economic fundamentals
Although fiscal imbalances were the sore point of
the Philippine economy after the regional crisis, it
has lately been declining. The national government’s
budget deficit as a proportion of GDP reached a
peak of 5.4 per cent in 2002 but has lately dropped
to about 1 per cent. With improvements in the
country’s fiscal position, public debt as a percentage
of domestic output declined from 101 per cent in
2003 to 84 per cent in 2006.
The fiscal deficit had widened after the regional crisis
as slow income growth impeded revenue collection,
while ample fiscal spending had to be maintained to
prevent a recession. The government was initially
able to reduce the shortfall through ‘spending
compression’ and subsequently through the
implementation of tax reforms (i.e. an increase in the
value-added tax and a lifting of VAT exemptions).8
Like fiscal deficits, the country’s level of external
borrowings remains a perennial concern as past
crises had been invariably linked to the level of
sovereign debt. However, the relevant indicators of a
default crisis – one possibly created by a panic-driven
withdrawal of foreign capital, specifically loans of
short maturity – have lately been benign.
External debt, 70 per cent of which comprises public
sector obligations, declined from 68 per cent of
GNP in 2001, its highest point in the past decade, to
42 per cent in 2006, allowing foreign receipts (from
goods, services and income payments) to cover a
greater portion of the country’s exposure. The share
of short-term foreign debt from the total
meanwhile declined from 13–15 per cent during the
regional crisis to about 9 per cent in 2006.
The country achieved current account surpluses
recently, but these were largely due to an influx of
overseas workers’ remittances. Large trade
imbalances persist and exports have failed to respond
as expected to the extended period of real exchange
rate depreciation. Exports of other East Asian
nations had picked up by 2003 after the bursting of
the US technology bubble a couple of years earlier,
but the Philippines’ foreign sales continued to falter
and appeared to recover only in 2006.
The domestic economy visibly started to progress at
the beginning of 2002, with GDP expanding at
about 5 per cent on average in the ensuing half-
decade. Growth has evidently not been high enough
or sustainable to achieve East Asian-style prosperity
and poverty reduction. However, there is also not
enough temptation to undertake extreme
countercyclical policies that could spark a crisis
(according to ‘second-generation’ crisis models).
From 2000 to 2005, the Philippines experienced
what had been termed as ‘jobless growth’ with
unemployment hovering about 11 per cent despite
continuous output expansion. Such a phenomenon, if
prolonged, would have compelled policymakers and
politicians alike to push for much higher growth in
order to make an impact on people’s lives.
Unemployment, however, has lately declined to
7.9 per cent, easing the pressure somewhat.
2.2 Financial stability
Bank performance in the Philippines deteriorated in
the aftermath of the crisis with NPL ratios rising to a
high of 17.4 per cent in 2001 (Table 2). The proportion
of distressed assets, which additionally includes
foreclosed real estate and restructured loans,
correspondingly increased to 28.4 per cent that year.
From being among Asia’s best performers initially,
the country’s banks suddenly held among the worst
portfolios in the region.
Monetary authorities viewed this weakness as
rendering the system vulnerable to shocks and
contagion effects in the event of major bank failures
(Guinigundo 2005a).9 With banks fearing further
declines in asset quality, weak balance sheets were
also identified as among the reasons for the
observed slowdown in bank lending.
Banks shifted their assets to government securities
(mainly Treasury bills and global debt papers) primarily
to ensure profitability, an opportune development
for the national government in the post-crisis period
as it badly needed to finance its deficits. As a result,
private banks have become widely exposed to
corresponding market and liquidity risks where large
and abrupt changes in bond prices potentially bring
about excessive losses to the system.
The NPL ratio eventually fell to single digit levels (to
8.2 per cent in 2005 and further down to 6 per cent
in 2006) owing to a more accommodative monetary
environment and the passage of legislation that
encouraged private asset management companies
(i.e. special purpose vehicles or SPVs) to dispose of
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idle assets through special tax and other privileges.10
These developments also significantly brought down
the ratio of distressed assets to about 15.8 per cent.
Current figures, however, remain higher than pre-
crisis levels. International rating agencies have in
addition questioned the veracity of reported NPLs
and shown concern about the quality of accounting
in emerging markets, as bad loans are reportedly
kept in bank books to avoid required provisioning.
Possible lapses in reporting and provisioning for
impaired loans and weaknesses of the supervisory
and regulatory regime have already been noted in
the country by such agencies, according to
multilateral observers (ADB 2006).
Notwithstanding initially weak portfolios, banks in
the Philippines were able to raise more than the
required amount of capital. The capital adequacy
ratio (CAR) calculated based on the Basel I formula
rose from 14.5 per cent in 2001 to 18 per cent in
2006 on a solo basis and from 15.6 per cent to
19.4 per cent on a consolidated basis (Table 2). These
are clearly above the benchmark levels of 10 per
cent, as required by the BSP, and 8 per cent, as
recommended under the Basel framework. These
rates are also much higher than in other crisis
countries save for Indonesia.
In contrast, bank profits now provide a smaller buffer
to adverse developments since returns on assets and
on equity weakened tremendously after the crisis.
The decline was partly due to increased loan loss
provisioning, which froze a large portion of banks’
funds. Indicators have been gradually recovering, but
remain well below their 1996 levels (Table 2).
Profitability had improved substantially in 2003 as
one major commercial bank unloaded a substantial
portion of its NPLs (Guinigundo 2005b).
Excessive risk-taking in Philippine banks resulting
from inherent moral hazard problems is being
remedied through the introduction of reforms in
prudential regulation and supervision. Standards
were initially strengthened through the adoption of
the Basel I framework, which entails risk-weighted
measurement of regulatory capital that takes
account of both credit risk, including those stemming
from off-balance sheet exposures (implemented in
2001), and market risk arising from banks’ open
positions on bonds, equities, foreign exchange and
derivatives (implemented in 2003). The BSP
prescribed a minimum CAR that is higher than the
Basel requirement in view of a delicate economy and
possible weaknesses in loan provisioning and in
anticipation of operational risk charges slated under
the Basel II framework (Espenilla 2005).
Basel II is set to be implemented in its basic and
standardised forms in 2007, with more advanced
approaches scheduled to be adopted by 2010 at the
earliest. Its three pillars deal with minimum
regulatory capital (with weights now assigned to
operational risk); an improved supervisory review
process that encourages the establishment of sound
internal processes within banks; and market discipline
through enhanced bank disclosure
While the new regulatory regime creates incentives
for banks to improve risk management, there are
serious concerns with regard to its implementation.
In particular, it may be infeasible in banking systems
captured by political and business elites and family-
dominated groups, and in countries with regulators
lacking technical capacity and institutional
independence (ASFRC 2005). Market discipline, for
instance, may be difficult to achieve in light of
underdeveloped capital markets, family-controlled or
state-owned banks, shortsighted shareholders,
unreliable accounting information, and the possibility
of market analysts’ assessments being manipulated.
Risk-sensitive measurement of regulatory capital may
also give rise to problems of ‘pro-cyclicality’ as
perception of risk tends to lower minimum capital
requirements in a boom, further fuelling demand,
and tighten capital standards in a bust, leading to a
‘credit crunch’ that can prolong a recession. This
exaggerates the business cycle and potentially creates
financial and economic instability (see the final article
by Griffith-Jones and Gottschalk in this IDS Bulletin).
It bears noting that capital adequacy, bank profitability
and bank loan performance are closely intertwined.
NPLs, which have higher risk weights, tend to lower
CARs, while also lowering profitability because of the
need for increased provisioning. Nonetheless,
Philippine banks have been able to achieve high CARs
in the presence of weak asset quality and relatively
low bank returns over the past several years.
According to regulators themselves, the strong level
of discipline had presented a ‘formidable challenge’
given the banking system’s severely eroded capital
base after the crisis (Espenilla 2005).
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As mentioned above, the large amount of NPLs
coupled with more stringent regulatory
requirements partly explains banks’ observed
reluctance to intermediate, which in turn reveals why
they have so far had significantly less exposure to
risks emanating from consumer debt, compared with
many of their counterparts in East Asia. Instead of
lending out their funds to the private sector, banks
operating in the country have chosen to place these
in government securities, which have a capital charge
of zero, to ensure returns.
But this practice is expected to end soon.
Introduction of a capital charge on government
securities under the Basel II framework will serve to
dampen demand, while a more benign fiscal position
will bring down the national government’s funding
needs.11 Meanwhile, improved asset quality will allow
banks to take on greater risk and seek other, more
profitable uses of their funds.
Under the current institutional setup, an important
source of regulatory weakness relates to the
predominance of financial conglomerates, defined by
local regulators as a group of companies under
common ownership and control, providing services in
at least two different financial sectors (i.e. banking,
insurance and securities). The BSP states there are
currently about nine universal banks and one
commercial bank forming the core of these entities.
These banks account for more than half (around
58 per cent) of the financial system’s total assets.
Financial conglomerates with opaque ownership
structures create vulnerabilities since banks from such
networks might in fact be run by persons with
conflicting interests (e.g. someone with greater stakes
in a financial affiliate that issues and trades securities
or in a non-financial and possibly unregulated
subsidiary), thus endangering bank capital and deposits.
Corporate governance issues especially abound in the
Philippines’ family-centered conglomerates as firms in
such business groups can gain even easier access to
credit from affiliated banks, leading to generally higher
leverage and greater susceptibility to a downturn (Lim
and Woodruff 1998).
These entities intensify the risk of contagion where
financial difficulties in one company can trigger a run
on an affiliated company. This may occur when not all
members of the group have sufficient capital or when
the capital of one is linked to the obligations of
another (e.g. through complex corporate structures
and extensive cross-shareholdings). Conglomerates
may also succeed in regulatory arbitrage by
transferring risk across asset classes (e.g. into deposits
protected by insurance or by securitising assets to
evade capital requirements) or by shifting certain
activities of regulated firms to unregulated companies.
Some of these concerns are already being addressed
under the current regulatory and supervision regime.
In 2004, state agencies with regulatory powers (i.e.
BSP, the Securities and Exchange Commission, the
Insurance Commission and the Philippine Deposit
Insurance Corporation) formed the Financial Sector
Forum (FSF), a loose, interagency mechanism designed
to coordinate supervision and regulation of the
financial system and promote information exchange.
It is hoped that the FSF will be able to eliminate
regulatory arbitrage and provide the various
regulators enough information to effectively monitor
intra-group exposures of conglomerates and ‘look
through’ their corporate structures to see whether
‘fit-and-proper’ rules (for directors and officers)
apply. However, whether or not such an
arrangement can approximate the effectiveness of
having a single, more focused regulatory body in
terms of actually unmasking and disciplining erring
business groups remains to be seen.
3 Other sources of weakness
The Philippines appears to have gained economic and
financial strength over the past decade, but it
remains by and large an outlier in the region.
Economic growth never breached East Asia’s pre-
crisis benchmark of above 6 per cent; international
reserves, initially built through debt rather than trade
surpluses, are much lower than elsewhere in the
region; and public sector debt, while declining, still
numbers among the highest in Asia as a proportion
of domestic output.
Rather than financial fragility per se, the country’s
biggest vulnerability relates to its historically low and
erratic development and the failure to effectively
leverage for long-term growth. These outcomes are
offshoots of flaws in its economic structure and
policies as well as its political institutions and
governance. Such weaknesses also help explain why
the international financial community has been less
forgiving of lapses in the management of the
domestic economy.
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Output growth in the country has been mainly
consumption-led, with relatively little set aside for
the accumulation of capital needed to sustain
growth. Savings as a proportion of GDP has risen
from 14 per cent in 1997 to about 20 per cent almost
a decade later, but the rate is still low compared
with over 30 per cent elsewhere in the region. The
failure to achieve high domestic savings, which is
often attributed to chronic budget deficits and an
inability to sustain economic development, effectively
places a cap on domestic expansion, creating a
vicious cycle of low, unstable growth.
The export sector remains susceptible to sudden
downturns that are out of reach of monetary levers,
given its heavy reliance on a few final markets
(chiefly, the USA and Japan) and its lack of product
diversification, with electronics and semiconductors
accounting for about two-thirds of total sales. An
import-dependent production structure meanwhile
limits the sector’s contributions to the domestic
economy, preventing it from becoming a powerful
engine of growth.
Exports grew rapidly from 1992 to 1999, climbing
from less than 30 per cent of GDP to over 50 per
cent, but it has underperformed in recent years. The
inertia shown in the figures – i.e. the lag in response
of foreign sales to a period of sustained real
depreciation – suggests the presence of price
rigidities and entrenched inefficiencies.12 Weaknesses
stem from past neglect of the sector under a system
of high trade protection (i.e. from the 1950s up until
the mid-1990s) that had a bias for capital-intensive
industries and import-substituting consumer goods
and a typically overvalued exchange rate.
With a sluggish domestic economy, there has been a
growing reliance on overseas workers’ incomes to
support growth and stabilise consumption. Workers’
remittances have consistently posted double-digit
expansion rates since the early 1990s, ultimately
allowing GNP to grow by over 6 per cent on
average in the last four years (2002–6). Money sent
home by the country’s migrant workers currently
amount to more than 9 per cent of national income
and about one-quarter of foreign exchange earnings.
Approximately 8.5 million Filipinos (one-quarter of
the country’s workforce) now work abroad.
Just like the country’s exports, remittances are
potentially at risk to sudden declines brought about by
external disturbances as inflows tend to stream from a
few major centres. The largest contributions come
from Filipino workers in the Middle East (36 per cent
of total remittances, of which 26 per cent originate in
Saudi Arabia), North America (9 per cent) and Japan
(8 per cent) (Burgess and Haksar 2005). In terms of
actual number, around one-third of overseas workers
are based in America alone, the largest group
recorded, while about one-fifth reside in the Middle
East (about 13 per cent in Saudi Arabia).13
The ever-increasing role of workers’ remittances,
while certainly serving as an important economic
safety net, also comes at a price. The rising number of
migrant workers, for instance, has substantial social
costs (e.g. families and little children typically left
behind, especially in the case of temporary workers)
and also raises the possibility of a ‘brain drain’ and
misallocation of human capital. In addition, the rapid
growth of remittances, which substantially boosts
national income, may lure the country’s leaders and
policymakers into complacency, reducing the pressure
to tackle badly needed reforms that can improve the
performance of the domestic economy.14
In this context, the emergence of enterprises based
on back-office activities such as business process
outsourcing (BPO), which also earn dollars while
creating employment within the country’s borders,
has been viewed as a welcome development. These
include call centres and companies engaged in
software development, animation, medical
transcription and other tasks that have been
outsourced by foreign firms (e.g. accounting and
human resource and claims processing). BPO export
revenues have increased from less than half a billion
in 2003 to more than US$2.5 billion in 2006;
equivalent to about 2 per cent of GNP.
Electronics and semiconductors and BPOs now lead
overall growth in the country’s foreign exchange
receipts. Even though BPOs earn less than one-tenth
of what the electronics industry brings in (i.e. US$2.5
billion versus US$30 billion), it provides work for
nearly a third in number, with total labour size
exceeding 120,000. The consensus in the industry is
that by the end of the decade, the sector will be able
to generate around US$10 billion in export revenues
and provide employment of approximately 1 million.
As is true for the country’s other exports, BPOs
cater to a predominantly American market. In
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Table 3 Sovereign credit ratings in Asia (long-term foreign currency)
Indonesia
Moody’s S&P
11/2006 B1 11/2006 BB–
5/19/2006 B1 Upgrade 7/26/2006 BB– Upgrade
2/27/2006 B2 12/22/2004 B+ Upgrade
9/30/2003 B2 Upgrade 10/8/2003 B Upgrade
6/26/2003 B3 5/12/2003 B– Upgrade
3/20/1998 B3 Downgrade 9/5/2002 CCC+ Upgrade
1/9/1998 B2 Downgrade 4/23/2002 SD
12/21/1997 Ba1 Downgrade 11/2/2001 CCC Downgrade
3/14/1994 Baa3 5/21/2001 CCC+ Downgrade
10/2/2000 B– Upgrade
4/17/2000 SD
9/12/1999 CCC+
3/30/1999 CCC+
3/29/1999 SD
5/15/1998 CCC+ Downgrade
3/11/1998 B– Downgrade
1/27/1998 B Downgrade
1/9/1998 BB Downgrade
12/31/1997 BB+ Downgrade
10/10/1997 BBB– Downgrade
4/18/1995 BBB Upgrade
12/7/1992 BBB–
Malaysia
Moody’s S&P
12/6/2004 A3 Upgrade 9/2006 A–
9/29/2004 Baa1 10/8/2003 A– Upgrade
9/25/2002 Baa1 Upgrade 8/20/2002 BBB+ Upgrade
6/24/2002 Baa2 11/10/1999 BBB Upgrade
10/17/2000 Baa2 Upgrade 9/15/1998 BBB– Downgrade
7/12/2000 Baa3 7/24/1998 BBB+ Downgrade
12/3/1998 Baa3 4/17/1998 A– Downgrade
9/14/1998 Baa3 Downgrade 12/23/1997 A Downgrade
7/23/1998 Baa2 Downgrade 12/29/1994 A+ Upgrade
6/4/1998 A2 9/13/1990 A–
12/21/1997 A2 Downgrade
3/15/1995 A1 Upgrade
1/20/1995 A2
3/15/1993 A2 Upgrade
3/12/1990 A3 Upgrade
11/18/1986 Baa1
Philippines
Moody’s S&P
11/2006 B1 2/2006 BB–
2/16/2005 B1 Downgrade 1/17/2005 BB– Downgrade
11/9/2004 Ba2 4/24/2003 BB Downgrade
1/27/2004 Ba2 Downgrade 2/21/1997 BB+ Upgrade
11/26/2003 Ba1 5/30/1995 BB Upgrade
addition, the BPO industry, which is based primarily
in the country’s metropolitan areas, has been less
able to mobilise the lower-skilled members of the
workforce. The greater challenge for poverty
reduction in the country is how to move the larger
number of unemployed in the rural areas into
labour-intensive sectors, such as manufacturing.15 This
divide is made evident by the growing scarcity of
skilled, English-proficient workers, said to be the
sector’s biggest impediment to growth. While the
IT-enabled sector certainly helps to generate much-
needed foreign exchange and to stimulate economic
activity, emerging bottlenecks highlight the need for
reforms in other areas, such as education.
The episodic nature of growth in the Philippines up
until the 1980s had been attributed to inward-
looking policies and the inability to pursue reforms as
well as an inauspicious macroeconomic environment
resulting from highly politicised management of
economic institutions. A period of change followed
where key sectors of the economy were liberalised
and key institutions reformed (e.g. creation of a
‘new’ and more independent central bank), and this
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Table 3 (cont.) Sovereign credit ratings in Asia (long-term foreign currency) – cont.
Philippines (cont.)
Moody’s S&P
5/18/1997 Ba1 Upgrade 6/30/1993 BB–
1/23/1997 Ba2
5/12/1995 Ba2 Upgrade
7/1/1993 Ba3
Korea
Moody’s S&P
11/2006 A3 7/27/2005 A Upgrade
3/28/2002 A3 Upgrade 7/24/2002 A– Upgrade
2/6/2002 Baa2 11/13/2001 BBB+ Upgrade
12/16/1999 Baa2 Upgrade 11/11/1999 BBB Upgrade
8/23/1999 Baa3 1/25/1999 BBB– Upgrade
2/12/1999 Baa3 Upgrade 2/18/1998 BB+ Upgrade
4/9/1998 Ba1 1/16/1998 B+
12/22/1997 B+ Downgrade
12/11/1997 BBB– Downgrade
11/25/1997 A– Downgrade
10/24/1997 A+ Downgrade
5/3/1995 AA– Upgrade
10/1/1988 A+
Thailand
Moody’s S&P
11/26/2003 Baa1 Upgrade 10/31/2006 BBB+
10/2/2003 Baa3 9/19/2006 BBB+
6/21/2000 Baa3 Upgrade 8/26/2004 BBB+ Upgrade
4/3/2000 Ba1 10/8/2003 BBB Upgrade
12/21/1997 Ba1 Downgrade 1/8/1998 BBB– Downgrade
12/1/1997 Baa3 Downgrade 10/24/1997 BBB Downgrade
11/27/1997 Baa2 Downgrade 9/3/1997 A– Downgrade
10/2/1997 Baa1 Downgrade 8/1/1997 A
4/8/1997 A3 Downgrade 12/29/1994 A Upgrade
8/1/1989 A2 6/14/1989 A–
Note For Moody’s, a rating of Baa indicates the presence of ‘moderate credit risk’. The equivalent rating for
Standard & Poor’s (S&P) is BBB (i.e. the sovereign issue described as ‘adequate’).
Source AsiaBondsOnline, ADB (as of February 2007).
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Table 4
P
hilippine balance of paym
ents: net capital and financial flow
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 rem
ittances (U
S$ billion)
1999
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0
0
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0
1
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0
2
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0
3
20
0
4
20
0
5
20
0
6
N
et capital and financial flow
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4.185
3.363
0.911
1.0
56
0.726
–1.630
2.229
–1.722
N
et capital flow
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0.163
0.138
0.0
62
0.0
27
0.0
54
0.0
17
0.0
40
0.136
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et financial flow
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4.0
22
3.225
0.849
1.0
29
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–1.647
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1.477
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urrent account balance
–2.874
–2.225
–1.744
–0.279
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–7.624
Incom
e
–1.0
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–0.427
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–0.294
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7.680
8.386
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11.391
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5.212
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6.328
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7.681
8.617
10.668
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3.591
–0.50
9
–0.20
2
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0.115
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2.410
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)
4.7
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3.2
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–0.3
1.0
0.1
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N
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2.280
–1.647
0.631
0.0
33
–0.899
–0.278
–1.80
3
0.469
M
em
o item
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C
hange in com
m
ercial banks’ net foreign assets
–1.835
0.891
–0.337
–0.60
4
–0.542
–0.152
–1.531
–4.656
O
FW
 cash rem
ittances
6.0
22
6.0
50
7.721
8.60
7
9.0
93
10.261
12.292
14.0
36
ofw
hich channelled through the banking system
†
†
6.0
31
6.886
7.579
8.551
10.689
12.762
†
There is no differentiation m
ade betw
een total O
verseas Filipino W
orkers (O
FW
) cash rem
ittances and rem
ittances channelled through the banking
system
 during the years 1999 and 20
0
0, w
hich represents the transition years of
the revised foreign exchange m
onitoring report form
 of
the B
SP.
Source
B
angko Sentral ng P
ilipinas (B
SP
).
succeeded in improving economic performance by
the mid-1990s. However, the era of reform did not
last long – a number of policies have either been
stalled, undone or reversed since then – leading one
to conclude that the root of the country’s problems
invariably stem from its poor governance and
unstable personality-based politics.
Indeed, many problems related to the country’s weak
institutions survive in the present. Political legitimacy
issues continue to hound the administration of
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, who had gained
power through quasi-constitutional means in 2001,
then was accused of vote-rigging in the 2004
presidential elections. This had made it extremely
difficult for the Macapagal-Arroyo government to
pursue economic reforms, especially if such were
widely believed to be unpopular. Passage of a much-
needed tax reform law to address rising fiscal
deficits, for instance, was repeatedly delayed and
almost appeared to have been shelved because of
strong opposition shown by some sectors.
Gridlocks in the legislature have also created
uncertainty, with detrimental effects on the economy.
Widely seen as a ruse by the ruling party to stay in
power, the recent attempt to change the country’s
Constitution and shift to a parliamentary system has
created animosity between the two houses of
Congress, as the desired shift to a parliamentary
system pushed by the Lower House would in effect
abolish the Senate. Mutual misgivings subsequently
led to an impasse on budget-related legislation and
for a time, restrained fiscal spending. Further
standoffs on important laws are to be expected as
the possibility of an opposition-dominated Senate
after the elections in 2007 looms large.
The combination of weak institutions and decades of
boom-and-bust growth (i.e. not managing growth
for four consecutive years) helps explain why the
international financial community has been reluctant
to lay a wager on the prospects of the Philippine
economy. This held true even after the country had
performed outstandingly during the regional crisis.
Table 3 shows how the sovereign credit rating
agencies have been much more forgiving of the
other crisis-affected countries in the region after the
crisis. Korea and Malaysia were able to merit an
upgrade within 1–2 years and Thailand within about
three years. Among the five affected economies,
Indonesia and the Philippines have both yet to
receive an investment grade rating. In contrast to its
neighbours, however, the Philippines had been
receiving downgrades beginning 2004, on account
of its worsening fiscal position and political climate.
Hence, the country has had weak access to external
credit, with repercussions on output as a country
with low domestic savings and a lack of internal
sources of funding for investments invariably
necessitates seeking external sources.
4 Coping with a capital boom
The sentiment of foreign investors, however, appears
to be shifting recently. Most investment banks are
now issuing favourable reports regarding growth
prospects in the country and there are growing signs
of an impending capital boom.
The Philippines has been recording current account
surpluses since 2003, owing largely to the growing
amount of money being sent home by the country’s
migrant workers (Table 4). Net current transfers, the
majority of which comprised workers’ remittances,
more than doubled from US$5.8 billion in 1999 to
US$13.2 billion in 2006.
Substantial inflows have also begun to enter the
country recently, in the form of financial
investments. Direct investment inflows amounted to
about US$1.7 billion net in 2005 and around
US$2.2 billion in 2006, while net portfolio inflows
came to around US$3.5 billion and US$2.7 billion,
respectively. The latter followed the trend elsewhere
in Asia, where high global liquidity streamed into
emerging markets seeking higher returns and
producing almost simultaneous currency
appreciations and equity market booms.
Although the influx of capital is certainly welcome to
help finance the country’s growth, there is reason to
be wary of a financial boom. Recent global crises
were mainly brought about by fragilities created by
financial excesses (Kaminsky 2003).
In a typical depiction (e.g. McKinnon and Pill 1994),
capital injections into economies with weakly
regulated financial sectors lead to over-lending by
banks that in turn precipitate consumption booms
and create asset price bubbles (e.g. in the stock and
real estate markets). Over-extended banks thus
become increasingly vulnerable to a recession –
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possibly one brought about by real exchange rate
appreciation and current account deterioration – and
an eventual bursting of asset bubbles, to which they
may have been widely exposed. The result is a
currency crash, since a fragile financial sector makes
the domestic currency exceedingly costly to defend.
Looking at relevant macroeconomic variables, a
similar scenario played out in affected countries
during the regional crisis (Figures 3–6). Focusing on
the Philippines, one can see how the years preceding
the period of sharp currency declines in the late
1990s had been characterised by booming asset
prices (in equities and housing) that were clearly
above the existing trend.
The same held true for output, albeit to a much
lesser extent, but oddly not for consumer prices,
which did not behave unusually prior to the
unwinding of financial imbalances. Liquidity,
however, had been high, with reserve money
growing by over 10 per cent (to over 12 per cent of
GDP), broad money by about 20 per cent, and
domestic credit by nearly 40 per cent (Table 1).
There have been analogous signs of asset price
booms recently, e.g. the peso has been
strengthening, the equity market has been on a roll
and property prices have been rising due to
purchases by overseas workers (Table 1, Figures 5
and 6). Housing prices, in particular, have lately been
far above trend and seem to be rising spectacularly.
Meanwhile, output and inflation remain benign,
masking potential risks should asset prices suddenly
reverse course. Reserve money as a proportion of
domestic output had been declining since 2003, but
recently soared to its pre-crisis level.
Hence the old problems of monetary management
are emerging, as the Mundell-Fleming dilemma
remains intact. The central bank’s decision to repay
its foreign loans and accumulate reserves has helped
keep the peso from drastically appreciating, but has
also served to bloat domestic liquidity. Reserve
money dramatically expanded by about 48 per cent
in 2006 (to a level equivalent to about 12.5 per cent
of GDP). The same is true of broad money, by some
18 per cent (to about 57 per cent of GDP). Monetary
authorities, however, have visibly failed to sterilise
inflows, at least in the traditional sense, with central
bank domestic assets even expanding during the
period.
Supposedly recognising the futility of trying to
manage the exchange rate while attempting to
control domestic liquidity, the Philippines along with
several other crisis countries in Asia adopted an
inflation targeting monetary regime. However, even
in the literature, it is not very clear how such a
framework can handle the dilemmas posed by large
capital flows – especially given current realities in
export-oriented economies with underdeveloped
financial systems – without eventually bringing up
some form of capital control.16
Moreover, looking solely at the inflation mean, which
is the crux of pure inflation targeting, may miss out
on possible signals of financial imbalances and future
financial strains. As we have seen, capital surges
hinder effective monetary management and can
bring about boom-and-bust cycles in asset markets
or even a currency crash. Philippine monetary
authorities may thus fail to detect future crises (and
even future sources of inflation) if they do not also
consider the behaviour of other variables such as the
level of household debt and asset prices when
conducting monetary policy.
Fortunately, another crisis may yet be averted as asset
market booms are still in their nascent stages. Easy
money has not yet created the dreaded over-lending
and over-borrowing cycles, with domestic credit
indicators remaining at safe levels (Table 1). Credit
extended to firms and households, in particular, has
yet to regain its original pre-1998 pace, while broad
money as a fraction of the country’s reserves, the
conventional ‘credit boom’ indicator, has not budged
substantially from its 1999 position.
The rise in the stock market is likewise in its budding
phase (and may have already dampened by the time
this article is printed). Chinese equities have recently
suffered a downturn (February 2007), sending stock
markets around the world tumbling, but there are
indications that investors may soon be clambering
back to certain emerging markets in East Asia, where
fundamentals are perceived to be firmly in place.
Moreover, looking at banks’ balance sheets, one
notices a sharp rise in net foreign assets (NFA) since
2004, which is the exact opposite of the steep fall
into negative territory that had occurred just before
the crisis. This trend is mirrored in the country’s
financial account as a net outflow of about
US$1.5 billion in 2005, when commercial banks were
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able to build-up their foreign assets through
currency and liquid deposits, and about US$4.7 billion
in 2006, when they took advantage of cheap dollars
to cut down their short-term foreign currency debt.
There has been, in short, no wide-scale foreign
currency borrowing and re-lending similar to that
which occurred previously. Inflows, which are largely
comprised of overseas workers’ remittances, allowed
unabated accumulation of NFA by private banks,
indicating some self-insurance at the micro-level and
greater stability overall (albeit not necessarily greater
bank efficiency).
5 Concluding remarks
There has been a marked improvement in the
Philippine economy in terms of the indicators one
typically looks at in assessing vulnerability to crisis.
The exchange rate has been afforded some degree
of flexibility, the country’s fiscal position has
improved after worsening radically and external debt
levels have substantially declined. More recently,
because of large inflows from its overseas workers,
the country has been able to post current account
surpluses and consequently build-up a robust level of
international reserves. Banks likewise have healthier
portfolios and higher capital adequacy ratios owing
to a more disciplined regulatory environment.
But much still needs to be done in terms of improving
the financial sector, as banks still carry the heavy
burden of financing the needs of the economy. While
tighter regulation has been able to buffer some of the
currency mismatches of financial institutions, currency
as well as maturity mismatches still remain, with the
latter vulnerabilities more suitably addressed by
developing the domestic capital market. This reform is
crucial to lessening the risk and increasing the
soundness of the entire financial system.
Also, as we have emphasised, old weaknesses remain
in terms of the country’s economic structure and
political pre-conditions for prosperity. The fiscal
picture, for instance, while it has significantly
improved, remains a concern given the large
temptation to backtrack on reforms and the
unpopularity of any new tax measure. Improving the
country’s fiscal position and increasing national
savings, however, are important ways, as investment
bankers would put it, to boost the country’s stock.
Because of its reliance on a few major markets for
its exports of goods and services and arguably even
remittances, the country remains highly vulnerable to
slowdowns elsewhere in the world, especially a US
slump. There is clearly a need to strengthen domestic
drivers’ growth, ideally one that is based on private
investment. One thus sees a golden opportunity in
the overflow of remittances that have yet to be
leveraged in a manner that can support the country’s
long-term growth.
Given a possible capital boom, the immediate concern
is resolving the dilemma the country’s monetary
managers face. What is clear, however, is that
monetary authorities will need to look beyond the
inflation rate and widen the variables it looks at, i.e.
look more closely at other asset prices apart from the
exchange rate, as such variables foretell a future bust.
In the final analysis, political legitimacy and
governance issues remain the main reasons for the
failure of government to institute and sustain
reforms sufficient to effectively leverage for growth.
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Notes
1 The Philippines was one of the few countries in
the region that did not escape the 1980s debt
crisis, earning it the much-abused moniker ‘Latin
American country in Asia’.
2 Capital inflows in the presence of currency
overvaluation tend to favour non-tradable sectors
such as real estate and construction. In the
Philippines, the bias towards consumption over
investment further increased the risk of asset
bubbles developing in the non-traded goods
sector (Gochoco-Bautista and Canlas 2003).
3 Crisis-afflicted countries such as Malaysia, Korea
and Thailand shared the following conditions:
benign fiscal positions, manageable real
appreciation of domestic currencies and capital
account surpluses that translated to current
account imbalances (and not vice versa). Financial
liberalisation that occurred earlier in the decade
led to an accumulation of short-term private debt
in foreign currency (and subsequent financial
collapse) mainly because of lack of prudential
regulation and supervision of financial
intermediaries combined with implicit guarantees.
Ironically, these countries borrowed in foreign
currency in exceedingly large proportions despite
high domestic saving rates.
4 As in the other countries, local monetary
authorities were torn between allowing the peso
to fall, which could fuel inflation and increase the
domestic value of foreign currency debt of banks
and companies, pushing them to bankruptcy, or
defending the domestic currency through high
interest rates, which could generate a recession
and cause certain banks to fail.
5 Unless otherwise indicated, all figures mentioned
in this section are summarised in Table 1.
6 Most currency crisis models view an exchange peg
as being central to the policy dilemma monetary
authorities face (basically, the ‘impossible trinity’
of the Mundell-Fleming framework), which in
turn serve as enticements for speculative play.
7 Its inverse, the ratio of M2 to reserves, is the
typical ‘credit boom’ indicator and has served as a
reliable leading indicator of currency crises in
empirical studies (e.g. Kaminsky et al. 1998;
Kaminsky 2003).
8 It is noted that such compression would not be
necessary, if only the national government
plugged its revenue leaks. Redundancy of fiscal
incentives granted to certain firms and enterprises,
for example, had been responsible for foregone
income amounting to about P45.8 billion or 1 per
cent of GDP in 2004 based on data from the
Board of Investments (Reside 2006).
9 In the literature, bank sector weakness is dreaded
for its potential effect on liquidity growth as
monetary authorities might be forced to bail out
troubled financial institutions; the end result being
a balance-of-payments crisis and a currency crash
(e.g. Diaz-Alejandro 1985).
10 By end-2005, around P97 billion worth of non-
performing assets (which includes NPLs and certain
types of real and other properties owned and
acquired) were sold through the implementation of
the SPV Act, reducing the existing stock by about
19 per cent. The law was extended for another two
years in early 2006. The BSP has stated this would
facilitate disposal of troubled assets worth about
P100 billion in half a year.
11 Under the standardised approach of Basel II,
national government securities will have a credit-
risk weighting of 100 per cent as Philippine debt
has an external credit rating of below investment
grade. Moving up the ratings ladder will allow the
risk weight to fall (e.g. to 0 per cent for triple-A
credit).
12 One thread in the ‘new open macroeconomics’
literature, for instance, argues that depreciations
may fail to have expenditure-switching effects if
the market structure is such that exporters fix the
price of their goods at the currency of the
consumer (see Engel 2002 for a summary). This is
an area of research that will surely require special
attention.
13 Nearly half of the country’s migrant workers are
permanently based abroad (primarily in America,
Canada and Australia) and thus have a weaker
incentive to send money to relatives as they are
able to eventually relocate their families (Tan 2006).
14 Pernia (2006), for instance, argues that the
remittance bonanza has kept the government
from pursuing ‘real policy reforms’ (e.g. a
population policy) that can raise the performance
of the domestic economy and reduce the need
for overseas employment. Note though that the
growth in numbers of dollar-earning Filipinos
(estimated at about 10 per cent of the
population), who are now also allowed to vote,
serves to weaken the bias for exchange rate
appreciation and hence prevent currency
overvaluation, thereby addressing a crucial
economic weakness.
15 It is hoped that the growth of BPOs will serve as
a catalyst for growth in other sectors. The real
estate market in Metro Manila, for example, has
significantly tightened because of BPO activity,
with positive implications for the banking system.
Meanwhile, the industry’s boom is also expected
to encourage infrastructure development, thus
generating more jobs.
16 Thus, in December 2006, in response to huge
capital inflows that had appreciated the baht,
inflation targeter Thailand imposed a tax on
inward portfolio investment similar to that used in
Chile. Equity prices fell by 15 per cent in just one
day and controls were quickly removed from
equities (but not for debt). It is for a similar reason
– the ability to drive away investors – that the
BSP is averse to imposing any form of capital
control. This is apart from the Philippines’ past
experience with exchange controls (i.e. for most
periods between the 1950s until 1992), which had
been difficult to administer and prone to abuse.
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